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SURVEY OF NASH AND STACKELBERG
EQUILIBRIIIM
STRATEGIES IN DYNAMICGAMES*
liv J. B. CRUZ, JR.
The characteristks of Nash tout Staekelht'rg equilibrium .strazegje
for d'uunu- gapm'.s art'rtljtis't'j Both strategies are appropriate when cooperation is not possibleor it'hc,, cooperation tonal b'guarante'J Open-loop, feedback and scinip!ed.daia strategies ore distinguished hi'dif]i'rences iii the intornlaIion.ctq arailable to the players. These strmegies are secure against aru'lnptsbya single plover to deciate from the equilibrium strategy during tilt' linw-hori:on of i/u' game.
I.INTRQDIJcTo
A dynamic game is a system with the following attributes:
(a) It has N persons, players, or decision-makers.
Player i chooses a control variable z/' froma set ofadmissible controls 1j'.
It has a time horizon which is defined by the interva![zn, t,-] wheretis
known and fixed, and1,-may be fixed or free and it may be finiteor infinite.
It has a state x(t) at time1,t[t0.t1] which is an element ofa finite
dimensional vector space X. The evolution of the stateis such that1(1)is uniquely
determined by the values oftion[ti, t].I=I.....N andx(l )for anyt1satisfying
to <r.We only consider state evolutions describable bydifferential equations
or difference equations.
Each player i has a real scalar cost functionj1which is a mapping from
X and Uw, i=I.....N to the set of real numbers.
Each player i has knowledge of an informationset !which may include
the differential equations for state evolution, the statex. its own cost function
mapping as well as those of the other players, and control strategiesof the other
players. The set I)} is called the information structure of thegame.
Each player i has a control law or strategyP which isa mapping
from the information setto the control space U1°.
A dynamic game whose state evolution is given by a differential equation
(I) = f(x.ut)ut,i)
is called a differential game. We assume that .f is continuously differentiable in
all its arguments andte[ta,tf].We only consider the case when t1 is fixed.
It is assumed that !for each i includes knowledge off. Clearly,is always
part df F'. Finally, we assume that Iincludes J"1 and x(t0). Possible additional
information to be included inwill be considered later.
Two types of strategies are reviewed in this paper. One strategy called the
Nash or Cournot equilibrium strategy will be considered first. The second strategy
we consider is known as the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy.
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II. NASH EQtiIIIBRIUM S1RAI1;us
When allthecost function mappings arc included in each/1)in additionto
thedata enumerated in the previous section. and if there is a set ofstrategies .,*U) where,*iijr° and
(i)*11) 1.,*(:)..*Ii f 1) (2) .. ,,,,, /
< fI)..(1 .*(i1) ;.U),*(I f I
for all "°[and for each i=I N then is defined asa set of
Nash equilibrium strategies [I, 2].
We define three types of Nash strategies. WhenJ)feri = 1,...,N Contain
no other information. the Nash strategy is called an open-loop strategy.When
P° for i=1. 2 N include X(i) at the present timefor all values ofpresent
time/ the Nash strategy is called a closed loop or feedback Nashstrategy. When
x(t)is included in JI for eachiand eachjwhere {tis a fInite set of instants
(countable set if
.is infinite) whereit (present time) the Nash equilibrium
strategy is called a sampled-data Nash strategy. Open-loopand closed-loop
Nash strategies are described in [l--8, 10] andsampled-data Nash Strategiesare
reported in [9].
The Nash strategy has the property that if all butone player use their Nash
strategies, the deviating player could not decrease thevalue of his or herown cost
function. Thus the Nash strategy safeguardsagainst a single player deviating
from the equilibrium strategy. However,two or more players could forma
coalition and possibly the coalition could gainby deviating from the Nash
strategy. The Nash strategy is reasonable whencooperation or coalitioncannot
be guaranteed and when the informationstructure is as stated above. Generally,
the open-loop, sampled-data, and closed-loopNash strategies yield different
values for cost functions since the informationstructures are different.
In open-loop strategies, the playerscommit their control functionson [t0, t] before the start of thegame. In sampled-data and closed-loopNash
strategies, the mappings from thespace of x(f1) or x(t) to U11 are announcedat the
beginning of the game. However, thesampled-data and closed-loop Nashstrategies
satisfy the principle of optimality [9.19]. This implies that if atany timeduring the game, the ith playerrecomputes his or her sampled-data Nashstrategy for a game starting at t. the desired sampled-dataNash strategy is identicalto the
previously computed strategy forit1. This property of the Nash strategymeans that the equilibrium conditionis secure against any singleplayer who may con- sider changing strategy(luring the game. The closed loopNash strategy also
satisfies the princpIe of optimalitySo that it is secure against any initiativeof a single player to deviate fromthe Nash equilibriumstrategy during the game. The open-loop Nashstrategy is of course a specialcase of sampled-data Nash
strategy where the only samplingtime is10.
Necessary conditions forobtaining Nash equilibriumstrategies for dynamic games have been obtained usingeither the variational approachor the optimal cost function approach viadynamic programming [1-4].In general numerical algorithms based on thesenecessary conditions are complex andnot easy to carry out [11]. When thedifferential equationsor difference equations are linear
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be expressed in termsof coupled Riccati-type matrixquadratic differentialor
differeilCe equations [2, 3, 6 10]. For the infinite horizon case, there is no general
result concerning the stability of the dynamic system. Neveithelessin specific
classes of linear-quadratic dynamic games, sufficient conditions for stabilityare
available [12, 14].
We mention two situations in political science and eConomicS whereNash
strategies have been considered. In [12] arms race between two flLtiOfls is modeled
by a pair of first order differential equations where the control variables are
expenditures in arms. These expenditures arc chosen by the nationsas Nash
feedback strategies in a two-person dynamic game model. The cost functions are
quadratic in arms level; expenditures, and consumption. As expected, the strategies
are linear in armslevel. The resulting closed-loop model givesa way of explaining
an earlier model byRichardson which contains no controls [12]. A similar formula-
Lion for a discrete-time model has been considered in [13].
In [14], necessary conditions for Nash strategies have been obtained for a
first order dynamic duopoly game. The concept of a dynamic demand function is
introduced whereby the rate of changeofprice is modeled as a function of price
and total quantity of goods in the market which is shared between two firms.
The performance functions are the negative valuesofthe profit. Specific results
have been obtained when the dynamic demand is linear and when the cost is
quadratic.
The Nash strategy for dynamic games, particularly the sampled-data Nash
strategy provides an attractive conceptual tool in dynamic economic problems
where Cournot equilibria are already accepted concepts for static models when
the horizon is short or static models for steady state equilibria. The dynamic
game models are more appropriate for intermediate length horizons or for
infinite horizons where the adjustment period for reaching steady state is not to
be ignored.
Ill. STACKELBERG EQu!unRIuI STRATEGIES
In this section we only consider Iwo-person games, where one player is called
the leader and the other player is called the follower. The leader knows the cost
function mapping of the follower but the follower may not know the cost function
mapping of the leader. However, the follower knows the control strategy of the
leader, and the follower always takes this into account in computing his or her
strategy. If playerIis the follower,''' is restricted to those strategies which
minimize JW for a given .2) The collection of pairs of such strategies is called
the reaction setofplayer 1. If there exists a pair
,,*(2)on the reaction set of
player 1 such that
(3) j(2';(;*1) _*)2)) < J12)(,(11 .,(2)
for any pair('"', on the reaction set of player I, thepair .,*(2) is defined
as a Stacke!berg strategy with player 2 as leader. Observe that'is the minimizing





If no other data are included in the inlorniation sets except those described
above and in Section I, the Stackelherg strategies are called open-loop strategies,
If x(t) is added to the inlbrmation sets of both players, the Stackclherg strategies
arc called closed-loop strategies. TheStackelbcrg strategy should be considered
whenever a player has an option to declare his or her strategy in advance.
So far as the follower is concerned the Stackelherg strategy is obtained from
an ordinary minimization problem and so long as the leader sticks to his or her
strategy the principle of optimality applies to the follower. Thus there is no
incentive for the follower to attempt to change strategy during the game, unless
the leader changes strategy also. However, for the leader, the principle of optirnality
does not apply in general [19]. lIthe leader is allowed to change strategy during
the game, say during sampling times of a sampled-data game, the leader will do
so if the new game starting at the new time will give a lower value for the remaining
cost function. Thus the strategies for all future times computed at a sampling time
may not be implemented at all except for the first interval following the computa-
tion, and the strategies may fluctuate.
A modification of the Stackelberg strategy which satisfies the principle of
optitnality is now defined. This was previously called feedback Stackelberg strategy
[19] (to distinguish it from closed loop Stackelberg strategy). However, because
the terms closed-loop and feedback are interchangeably used in other contexts
in many other areas, it is proposed that the modified Stackelberg strategy be called
Stackelherg equilibrium strategy.The modified strategy is secure against potential
changes by the leader during the game. Thus it is appropriate to call it an equi.
librium strategy. 'l'he Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is simpler to compute
than the Stackelberg strategy but it is still more difficult to compute compared
to the Nash equilibrium strategy because of the requirement that the leader choose
a strategy on the reaction curve of the follower. This imposes a complicated
constraint for the optimization of the leader.
Formally, we define the Stackclberg equilibrium strategy for a discrete-time
system,
x(l + 1) = f(x(l). l,:i(l). u2(1)), x(0) = x0, 1 = 0 N
where the state x(l) and the decision variables u1(l) and u2(!)are si-dimensional,
ni1-dimensional, and iu2-dimensional vectors of real numbers respectively. Let
the cost ftinctionals defined over the stages k.....N be
J'1(x(k). k,i,1,U2)= K4(x(N))
+
L(x(1), 1. u (I). u,(l)).
Let u1(l) = 1132(1) and "21)= '/22(') be the Stackclherg equilibrium strategies
with player 2 as leader starting at stage I in thesense to be defined here. The
strategies )'2(I) are mappings from the integer set [1 \!-- I] and x(l) in the
case of open-loop strategies, but in the case ofdo. ed loop strategies. these are
mappings from the integer set [I.....NI] and the state set {x(k):k =
N - I), where x(k) is generated from (4), andthe decision variables u1 and u2
belong to specified admissiblesets. Denote the cost corresponding to the Stackel-
berg equilibrium strategies startingat stagek + I by VW(x(k-- 1). k + 1).
V"1(x(k + l),k + I)= .P(x(k + l).k +l.y1,,(k+ l).'2,(k + I)).
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The admissible set for decision variables in defining the Stackelbeigequilibrium strategies at stage k is restricted to the set of decision variableswhich are also
Stackelberg equilibrium strategies at stage k + 1. Thus
J111(x(k),k, u1ni2) = V"1(x(k -1-1). k + 1) + !(x(k)u 1(k). ii,(k)).
With player 1 as follower and player 2 as leader, the Stackelbergequilibrium
strategy is defined in the same way as the Stackelberg strategy in (3)except that
insteadof usingJin (5), we use Jin (7), with the boundary condition
V"'(x(N),N) = K.(x(N)).
This definition is identical to the feedback Stackelberg strategy in [19] when the
decision variables are closed-loop functions. However, in the present definition.
the decision variables are not necessarily closed loop functions.
The Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is attractive whenone player has
enough information to be a leader. However, the potential leadermay find that
it is preferable to be a follower, in which case, he or she would divulge enough
information for the other player to be a potential leader instead. Sucha move
would not necessarily convince the latter player to play as leader. However.
once a player decides to lead, the other player would have no better choice than
to play Stackelberg equilibrium strategy as follower assuming of course that the
leader announces his strategy first.
The Stackelberg equilibrium strategy appears to be appropriate for the
optimal stabilization problem considered in [15] where one player is the govern-
ment policy maker and the other player is the competitive private sector. The
private sector takes the government policy as given, and maximizes a consumer
surplus objective function. The government policy maker must take into con-
sideration the effect of their policy rules on the private sector's decision rules.
The government policy should be chosen to maximize some welfare function.
assuming that the private sector is reacting optimally. Although the Nash equi-
librium strategy could be justified for this problem, the Stackelberg equilibrium
strategy appears to be a more suitable concept in this case.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The properties of Nash and Stackclberg equilibrium strategies for dynamic
games have been reviewed. These strategies are appropriate whencooperation
is not possible or when cooperation cannot be enforced. In two-player games.
these strategies are secure against attempts by a single player to deviate from its
dynamic equilibrium strategy during the time horizon of the game. In economic
situations where Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria are already useful concepts
for static models or short-horizon models, the dynamic game models reviewed
here should prove to be more useful when the horizon is not too shortsuch that




IiJI-I.( .i'a'.Toss arti a 1hcorat Maiiv Player E)iilcrcn thu(I unic'Si 'I I! J (tfl (P)/ro/7 (JO69) pp. 179 97.
1?] AV Starrntl V ('"i-a""-rcntual (,uuuue' J,,urnjj a!0piün,:o,u,, i/sacs ansi.4ppllcailons (JOTi; 3,(1969), pp.I 84 206
[3] A. W.Starr and V. C. I-Jo, "I- iirther Pi'operticsof Nm/cro_Ssim E)itfereiitialFames,'' JO74 3 (1969), pp. 207tO.
[41I. G. Sarma, R. K. Ragade, and Li. R. Prasasj,'Necessary ('onditions ftrOptimal Straiegiin - a Class of NoncooperativeN-person Differential (iaiJie," S/Alt 3.n (Oz(s/ 7l96(),pp 637 44.
[5) Y. C. Ho, "Differential Games, DynamicOptimization, and (ieiueralj,J('ntro( The-." iOTA.6.11970), pp. l79 209.
16) D. L. Lukes and D. F. Russel,"A Global Them-s for LmearQuadratic I)ifl'erenijal(l" -Journal o/ .'iaihemr:i,s-a/ .4nulrsis andApp1icaio,o,33, (1971), pp 96 123
D. L. Lukes, ' Equilibrium Feedback Controlin Linear Gaines wtth QuadrtticCosh" S/A t I.on ('on,'ro/,9, (1971), pp. 234 -52.
M. H. Foley and W. E. Schmitendorf,"On a Class of Nonzero-Sum Lineur
Quadratic (lames" JO1A, 7, (1971), pp. 357-77.
NI. Simaan and J. B. Cruz, Jr.,"Sampled Data Nash ('oiitrols in
NonzeroSum Differential Games," tat. J. o/ Control, 17, (1973),pp. 120109
[103 NI. Simaan and J. B. Cruz,Jr., "On the Solution of the Open-LoopNash RiccatjEquations in Linear Quadratic Differential Gaines."Ins'. J. o/ Gni,r/, 18,(1973t pp 57 3 [II] L. F. Pau. "Differential GameAmong Sectors in a Macro-economy"
IFAC IFORS mtConf on Dynamic Modeling and Control of NationalEconomics pp 254-81, M. Simaan and J. B. Cruz. Jr.."A Differential Game Exampleof Armament Reduction"Proc. aft/u'7thAnnual Pr,m'eto,i Confon IrifSeienct',smid Si.cts'ni5 (1973),pp 327 31 Rc isedversion to appear in The Ru't'ju'w of Econrnnjt-
Sutdje.s, "Formulation ofRichardson's Model of ArmsRace from a Differential GameViewpoint" 1975.
M. Siniaan and J.B. Cruz, Jr., "NashEquilibrium Strategies for theProblem of Armament Race and Control," toappear int!anagL',,ie,if Science, 1975
M. Siniaan and 1. Takayama,"Dynamic DuopolyGame'Differential GameTheoreticApproach.. Faculty Working Paper #155,College of Commerce andBusiness Adminis(rationUniversity of Illinois, Urbana.ChampaignFebruary 6, 1974.
[l5J F. Kydland and E.C. Prescott, "OptimalStabilization A New Approach,"presented at NBER. NSF Stochastic Controland Economic SystemsConference, Chicago, June 7.9,1973 [16] H son Stackelbcrg,The Theory of the Marks',&'ono,m',(1952), Oxford UniversityPress. Oxford, England,
[173 C. 1. Che and J.. Cruz, Jr., "Stackelbcrg Solution for Iwo-Person
Games with BiasesjInforma- tion Patterns"IEEE Tra,,s.M,, ('otis'.,.4('-7(1972), pp 791 -98 [183 M. Sintuan andJ. B. Cruz, Jr., "On the
Stackelberg Strategy inNon/eroSum Games"iOTA II, (1973),pp. 533-55,
[19) M Simaan and J.B. Cruz, Jr.. "AdditionalAspects of the StackelbergStrategy in Nonzero.Suni Games," iOTA, Il,(l973)PP. 613-26.
M. Simaan and J. B. Cruz,Jr., "A StackelbcrgStrategy for Ganies withMany Players," IEEE Trans. Aut. ('on,A('-18, (1973),pp. 322 -24 1. Basar, "On theRelative LeadershipProperty of SlackelbergStrategies" iOTA, II,(1973), pp. 655-61.
M.Simaan, "Sackelbergvs. Nash Strategiesin NoitzcroSunt I)ifTerentialGanses," Proc Eihti/i Pm, c('(ofl Confs'rs':is's' on Si'.cju',,ic r,,reIInfór,n5,,j55Sc/sass's(1974)
344
t